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Introduction
On April 8, 2010, President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry 
Medvedev signed a new strategic offensive arms agreement to replace the 
1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), which expired in 
December 2009.1 Although the replacement accord (termed New START) 
enjoyed support from current U.S. military leaders and a bevy of Republi-
can national security veterans and was ultimately passed by the U.S. Sen-
ate on December 22, 2010, "no other Russian-American arms control 
treaty that was ultimately ratified ever generated as much opposition on 
the final vote."2 This article will detail New START's principal numerical 
limits and its monitoring measures, outline Republican concerns vis-à-vis 
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the new accord and steps taken by the Obama administration to assuage 
these, and assess the prospects of further arms control in the wake of New 
START.
New START Provisions and Verification Measures
Under New START, the United States and Russia are limited to 1,550 
deployed strategic nuclear warheads on no more than 800 deployed and 
non-deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles—a steep cut from START 
I levels, which permitted each side 6,000 warheads on 1,600 delivery 
vehicles or launchers.3 The New START limit on deployed strategic war-
heads is 30 percent lower than the warhead ceiling of 2,200 set by the 
2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT, or Moscow Treaty). 
The warhead limit covers those deployed on intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (ICBMs) and deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
(SLBMs), as well as counting each heavy bomber equipped with nuclear 
armaments as carrying only one warhead.
New START utilizes a different approach to counting warheads than 
START I. While the 1991 treaty used a type-attribution counting rule that 
assigned each ballistic missile type a number of warheads, the new accord 
uses an actual-load counting rule. The latter approach is preferable 
because it allows both sides to deploy different numbers of warheads on 
the same type of missile, providing greater flexibility for each side to 
determine its force structure while remaining in compliance with the 
treaty.
Under New START, heavy bombers equipped with nuclear armaments are 
counted as carrying one nuclear warhead each, because it is currently nei-
ther Russian nor American operational practice to maintain nuclear 
weapons aboard heavy bombers (in contrast to the warheads deployed on 
ICBMs and SLBMs). Moreover, the American belief that heavy bombers 
are the least destabilizing leg of the strategic triad influenced the counting 
rule. In contrast to START I, the new treaty's limits will not apply to heavy 
bombers and submarines not equipped with nuclear armaments. Never-
theless, New START does contain inspection provisions to assure the Rus-
sians that these weapons platforms no longer have a nuclear role.
Although the new accord has a full set of verification measures, Presidents 
Obama and Medvedev agreed last July to streamline monitoring provi-
sions. New START includes provisions that prohibit each side from inter-
fering with the other's national technical means of verification (for 
instance, satellites) and requires Moscow and Washington to exchange 
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and regularly update data on certain characteristics of their strategic 
forces. Reduced access to Russian telemetry was of concern to Republican 
Senators in debating whether to back the accord (START I mandated that 
all telemetry be shared). Despite assurances by senior American officials, 
including Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, that the U.S. does not need 
access to Russian telemetry to ensure Moscow's compliance with the 
treaty, some Senators believed that the new accord would weaken pre-
existing verification provisions. To assuage these concerns, the Obama 
administration negotiated access to telemetric data from up to five ballis-
tic missile tests annually.4 Russian negotiators were hesitant to provide 
the access because Washington stands to gain much more information 
from Russia's ongoing tests of the Bulava SLBM and the Topol-M ICBM 
currently under development than Moscow does from observing Ameri-
can Minutemen III and Trident D-5 launches, which Russia has already 
observed for many years.5 
The treaty establishes two types of inspection: Type One inspections, 
which will take place at ICBM, submarine, and air bases (up to 10 per 
year), and Type Two inspections which will occur at ICBM loading facili-
ties, test ranges, training ranges, and formerly declared facilities (up to 
eight annually).6 One of the major purposes of Type One inspections is to 
confirm the number of warheads on a deployed ICBM or SLBM.
New START Ratification: Republican Concerns and 
Administration Responses
The Senate debate and the ensuing resolution to ratify the New START 
treaty reflected Senators' concerns about three issues in particular: Rus-
sian opposition to the deployment of U.S. missile defenses, Russian con-
cerns about U.S. long-range conventional strike weapons, and U.S. 
concerns about Russian tactical nuclear weapons (TNW). Despite seven 
months of deliberations on the New START accord, including eighteen 
hearings and approximately 1,000 written answers to questions, objec-
tions, and concerns from Senators, the treaty was finally approved after a 
cloture vote largely along party lines (71–26).7 
Republicans, led by Senator John Kyl (AZ), made clear that their support 
of New START would depend, among other things, on sufficient funding 
being provided for the maintenance and modernization of the U.S. 
nuclear weapons complex. These conditions were codified in Section 1251 
of the FY2010 defense appropriation bill, drafted by Senator Kyl. Section 
1251 required "a comprehensive plan to (1) maintain delivery platforms; 
(2) sustain a safe, secure, and reliable U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile; and 
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(3) modernize the nuclear weapons complex."8 In order to fulfill this 
requirement, the Obama administration promised, when it submitted 
New START to the Senate for ratification on May 13, 2010, that the 
United States "will invest well over $100 billion in nuclear delivery sys-
tems to sustain existing capabilities and modernize some strategic sys-
tems" and "invest $80 billion in the next decade to sustain and modernize 
the nuclear weapons complex," beginning with a $7 billion request for 
FY2011, a 10 percent increase over FY2010.9 When some Republican Sen-
ators deemed the proposed funding level insufficient, the administration 
submitted an update to the Section 1251 report in November 2010, detail-
ing an intention to request $600 million more for the nuclear weapons 
complex in 2012 than had been stated in the plan submitted in May. Not 
surprisingly, the directors of the three U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories 
were "very pleased" with the updated figures, although the extent of the 
necessary refurbishment programs is debatable.10 
Republican Senators also sought to ensure that the accord did not inter-
fere with the ability of the United States to develop and deploy missile 
defenses. Specifically, the Senators pushed to eliminate language from the 
treaty's non-binding preamble, to the effect that there exists an undefined 
"interrelationship" between strategic offensive and defensive systems. 
This initiative was defeated only after President Obama wrote to the Sena-
tors on December 18, 2010 and pledged to "fully deploy all available mis-
sile defense systems, including those against ICBMs."11 
Yet a third concern among the Senators was the accord's treatment of 
long-range conventional strike weapons. In response to Russian worries 
that such weapons—especially if mounted on ICBMs—could serve as a 
first-strike capability and endanger Russia's ability to respond with a sec-
ond-strike, Washington conceded that this type of weapon would be 
counted within overall treaty limits. The Senators attempted to amend the 
treaty to ensure that this concession would not prevent deployment of 
such systems. A December 20, 2010 letter to Senators from Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen helped to defeat the 
amendment proposal. (Any amendments to the text of the treaty were 
viewed as "treaty killers" because they would require re-negotiation with 
Russia.)
A final concern of Republican Senators opposed to the ratification of New 
START was the lack of a provision in the treaty text regarding TNWs, an 
area in which Russia enjoys considerable numerical superiority. Although 
TNWs are not regulated by New START or any other arms control 
agreement, had the Senate failed to ratify New START, a future Russian-
American negotiation on TNWs would have proven difficult. In fact, to 
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placate the concerned parties, the Obama administration made a 
commitment to address the issue in the next round of negotiations, slated 
to begin within one year of New START's entry into force—a difficult, 
though achievable, proposition.12 Ultimately, although the Senate ratified 
the New START treaty, an accomplishment that most—though not all—
observers hailed as major foreign policy success of the Obama 
administration,13 numerous potential obstacles remain to realizing the 
full scope of the administration's disarmament agenda.
The Response in Moscow
Immediately after learning of the ratification of the New START accord, 
President Medvedev commended the U.S. Senate on the achievement. 
However, Medvedev warned that members of the Russian Duma and Fed-
eration Council (the lower and upper chambers of the Russian Parlia-
ment, respectively) would have to delay endorsement of the accord until 
they could verify that Washington's ratification text had not altered the 
text of the treaty.14 Although the Duma initially intended to time its ratifi-
cation of the accord to coincide with that of the U.S. Senate, upon learning 
of the amendments made by U.S. Senators to the ratification protocol, 
Duma members announced that to pass New START would require three 
rounds of voting. Like their counterparts in Washington, Russian parlia-
mentarians submitted additions to the ratification document, but with the 
opposite intent.15 Although New START passed the first vote in the Duma 
(350–58), lawmakers adopted five amendments and two statements on 
the accord's ratification during the second ratification vote on January 
14.16 Specifically:
"[T]he chamber incorporated in its ratification text various stipu-
lations on the pact's implementation, including conditions that 
could prompt Moscow to stop participating in the pact and a call 
for the Kremlin to plan updates to Russia's strategic deterrent. 
Russia would also reserve the right to withdraw from the treaty if 
the United States breaches the pact, if Moscow deems future U.S. 
missile shield deployments to pose an unacceptable strategic risk, 
or if Washington prepares strategic conventional armaments 
without permission from a Bilateral Consultative Commission."17 
While some observers discount these developments, pointing out that the 
accord has already been signed by both the American and Russian presi-
dents, others contend they have the potential to sidetrack President 
Obama's disarmament agenda.18 
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Conclusion: Prospects Moving Forward
With the bilateral ratification of New START complete, the United States 
and Russia will need to discuss, and hopefully come to agreement, on a 
variety of other pressing arms control issues not limited to: Bilateral 
reductions in TNWs, ratification and signature of the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty, and the challenge posed by non-deployed strategic warheads. 
The lukewarm support received by the New START accord in the Senate 
(previous arms control treaties have typically been approved with 80 to 
90 votes in favor), the widespread—but erroneous—notion that Moscow 
did not make any concessions in the recently concluded negotiations, and 
the uncertainty surrounding President Obama's re-election next year may 
make Moscow hesitate to engage in further negotiations.19 Although seri-
ous talks on any of the above-mentioned issues are unlikely to begin until 
early 2013, very cautious preliminary discussions could commence as 
early as next spring.20 
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